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According tomanymodern economic theories, actions simply reﬂect
an individual’s preferences, whereas a psychological phenomenon
called “cognitive dissonance” claims that actions can also create
preference. Cognitive dissonance theory states that after making
a difﬁcult choice between two equally preferred items, the act of
rejecting a favorite item induces an uncomfortable feeling (cogni-
tive dissonance), which in turnmotivates individuals to change their
preferences to match their prior decision (i.e., reducing preference
for rejected items). Recently, however, Chen and Risen [Chen K,
Risen J (2010) J Pers Soc Psychol 99:573–594] pointed out a serious
methodological problem, which casts a doubt on the very existence
of this choice-induced preference change as studied over the past
50 y. Here, using a proper control condition and two measures of
preferences (self-report and brain activity), we found that the mere
act of making a choice can change self-report preference as well
as its neural representation (i.e., striatum activity), thus providing
strong evidence for choice-induced preference change. Furthermore,
our data indicate that the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex tracked the degree of cognitive dissonance on a tri-
al-by-trial basis. Our ﬁndings provide important insights into the
neural basis of how actions can alter an individual’s preferences.
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In Aesop’s Fable “The Fox and the Grapes,” a fox tries to getsome grapes that are hanging on a high, unreachable vine.
After failing to reach them, the fox decides that the grapes were
probably sour anyway. An interesting aspect of this story is the
idea that actions (e.g., giving up on the grapes) can change
preferences. Because the dissonance-induced preference change
indicates that behaviors can create, not just reﬂect, people’s
preferences, it challenges a vital assumption in neoclassical eco-
nomics that preference or “hedonic utility” determines people’s
behavior (1).
Since Brehm’s original study in 1956 (2), this sort of preference
change (i.e., the increase in ratings for chosen goods and/or the
decrease in ratings for rejected goods) has been repeatedly ob-
served under the “free-choice paradigm” (3–6). In a typical free-
choice study design, participants are asked to: (i) rate their pref-
erence for a set of goods (e.g., art prints, CDs, and so forth), (ii)
choose between two of the goods, and (iii) rate them again. After
making a difﬁcult choice between two equally preferred items at
stage ii, individuals tend to like the selected item more and the
rejected item less than they originally did (2). This tendency
happens because when making a choice between two equally
highly preferred items, individuals have to give up either of the two
liked items. According to cognitive dissonance theory (7), simulta-
neously holding two or more contradictory cognitions (e.g., “I like
the item” and “I rejected it”) causes a psychological discomfort
called “cognitive dissonance,” and individuals are motivated to re-
duce this discomfort by changing their original preferences. There-
fore, in this particular case, individuals reduce their preferences for
the rejected item so that two cognitions are consistent with each
other (e.g., “I don’t like the item” and “I rejected it”; similarly, when
a choice wasmade between two equally unpreferred items, choosing
a disliked item induces cognitive dissonance, and individuals in-
crease their preferences for the chosen item to reduce it). The ex-
istence of choice (dissonance)-induced preference change is further
supported by a neuroimaging study showing that the activity in the
anterior striatum, a region implicated in reward processing, is cor-
related with the choice-induced preference change (8).
However, a serious methodological problem in the free-choice
paradigm has been recently pointed out by Chen and Risen (9).
Their critique raises the possibility that the choice-induced pref-
erence change reported in studies that have used the free-choice
paradigm over the past 50 y, including a recent neuroimaging
study (8; see also ref. 10), might be just a methodological artifact.
Chen and Risen (9) argue that the free-choice paradigm
measures ostensible preference change, even if the individual’s
true preferences remain completely unchanged (i.e., even in the
absence of cognitive dissonance). Their arguments are based on
two assumptions. First, individuals’ ratings contain at least some
noise, and the ratings are not perfect measures of one’s true
preferences. Second, individuals’ choices are at least partially
guided by their true preferences, and thus their choices reveal
some information about their true preferences. Thus, even if two
goods are rated equally in self-reports, it does not necessarily
mean that true preferences for these two goods are also exactly
the same (ﬁrst assumption; similarly, even if one good is rated
higher than the other, true preference might be the opposite).
Accordingly, when choices were made between two goods that
have the same (or similar) initial ratings, true preference for
a chosen good is likely to be higher than true preference for
a rejected good (second assumption). Then, when participants
are asked to rate the same goods again, it is more likely that their
rating for a chosen good would increase and that for a rejected
good would decrease, on average, than vice versa (for complete
discussion and mathematical proof, see ref. 9).
Chen and Risen (9) also provided experimental data to support
their claims. Whereas the typical free-choice paradigm follows
a “rate, choose, and rate” order, the new Chen and Risen ex-
periments include a control condition in which participants made
a choice after they had made two preference ratings (thus, they
followed a “rate, rate, and choose” order). In both conditions,
items were categorized as “chosen” or “rejected” according to the
subject’s choice at each choice stage, and preference changes for
chosen items and rejected items from the ﬁrst to the second rat-
ings were calculated. Because subjects made their choice at the
end of the experiment in the rate-rate-choose condition, any
changes between the two preference ratings can never be attrib-
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uted to choice-induced cognitive dissonance. Nevertheless, both
conditions are expected to produce preference change in a man-
ner that is consistent with the past cognitive dissonance literature
(i.e., increased preference for chosen and decreased preference
for rejected items), because participants’ choices contain in-
formation about their true preferences, regardless of when the
choice is made. In other words, because the effect of the in-
formation revealed by choice is equalized between the rate-
choose-rate and rate-rate-choose conditions, and the only differ-
ence between the conditions is whether subjects made their choice
before or after the second rating session, the effect of choice-
induced cognitive dissonance can be isolated by comparing pref-
erence changes in these two conditions. Consistent with their
prediction, Chen and Risen (9) found that there was a signiﬁcant
preference change even in the rate-rate-choose condition, in-
dicating that the preference change measured in a typical free-
choice paradigm can occur in the absence of cognitive dissonance.
When compared with this rate-rate-choose condition, subjects
who followed the typical free-choice procedure (i.e., the rate-
choose-rate condition) showed a tendency for more preference
change, but it did not reach statistical signiﬁcance (9). Thus, after
more than 50 y of research, the evidence for choice-induced
preference change still remains inconclusive.
Thus, the primary purpose of the present study was to in-
vestigate the existence of choice-induced preference change with
proper control to eliminate this methodological artifact (9). We
used two independent measures of preference: self-report and
brain activity. By using a neural measure of preference, it was
possible to further test whether choice-induced preference
change is just a superﬁcial phenomenon seen only in the self-
report, or whether choices can alter not only self-report prefer-
ence but also its neural representation. Toward this goal, as in
a previous neuroimaging study (8), we focused on the striatum
as our region of interest (ROI). It is well established that the
striatum, especially its anterior part (e.g., caudate head and
nucleus accumbens), tracks individuals’ reported preference for
various types of stimuli (8, 11–14).
In the current experiment, subjects inside the functional MRI
(fMRI) scanner were ﬁrst asked to rate their preference for 160
food items (Preference task 1) (Fig. 1A). Following Preference
task 1, subjects made choices between pairs of foods (Self trials
in the Choice task) (Fig. 1B, Upper) which varied systematically
so that choices were sometimes made between two equally liked
items (Self-Difﬁcult trials), and other times between one liked
item and one disliked item (Self-Easy trial). In still other trials,
choices were made randomly by a computer between two equally
liked items (Computer trials) (Fig. 1B, Lower). Following the
Choice task, subjects rated their preferences for the same 160
foods again. Importantly, in this Preference task 2 (Fig. 1C),
subjects were also presented with information about the previous
decisions made in the Choice task (e.g., “You rejected it”; Fig.
1C). This process was intended to make subjects perceive the
inconsistency (or consistency) between their preferences and
past decisions for each food item. Our critical trials were those in
which subjects perceived that they had rejected their liked foods
(rejected items in Self-Difﬁcult trials of the Choice task);
according to the cognitive dissonance theory, their preferences
for these foods were predicted to be reduced (7). In other trials
in which subjects rejected disliked foods or chose preferred
foods, less dissonance would be induced (therefore, little or no
preference change was expected) because choosing preferred
foods and rejecting unpreferred foods are more consonant than
rejecting liked foods. Moreover, for items chosen or rejected
randomly by a computer, no dissonance was expected because
subjects were not responsible for the choices (2). Finally, to
control information about subjects’ preferences as revealed by
their choices and to isolate the effect of choice-induced prefer-
ence change, we had subjects perform a Post-Experimental
Choice (PostEx-Choice) task outside the fMRI scanner. This
PostEx-Choice task creates an analogous condition to the rate-
rate-choose condition used in Chen and Risen (9). During this
task, subjects were presented with the same food pairs used in
the Computer trials of the Choice task and asked to select the
one that they preferred. As subjects had not been responsible for
the choices during the Computer trials, these choices provided
additional information about their true preferences for the
items. Because food pairs for the Computer trials were de-
termined similarly to the Self-Difﬁcult trials (for both conditions,
pairs consist of two equally preferred foods; Methods), choices
subjects made in the Self-Difﬁcult and the PostEx-Choice trials
were equally informative about how much preference change
could be expected, even in the absence of cognitive dissonance.
In addition to the investigation of choice (cognitive dissonance)-
induced preference change, the present study also investigated
the neural correlates of cognitive dissonance itself. Despite its
signiﬁcant inﬂuences in the ﬁeld of psychology (15), the neural
processes underlying cognitive dissonance are still not fully un-
derstood. We chose the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and an-
terior insula as ourROIs. The involvement of theACC in cognitive
dissonance has been predicted by Harmon-Jones (16, 17). Re-
cently, van Veen et al. (18) adapted the induced compliance par-
adigm (19) to the fMRI scanner and found that the ACC and an-
terior insula are involved in cognitive dissonance. In the present
study, we sought to extend their ﬁndings (18) and test whether the
ACC and anterior insula track subjects’ perceived dissonance on
a trial-by-trial basis. In the current free-choice paradigm, it is pos-
sible to quantify the degree of dissonance in each trial by calcu-
lating the discrepancy between subjects’ past decisions (i.e., chose
or rejected) and their preferences for each food item (Methods).
Fig. 1. Experimental tasks. (A) Preference task 1. In each trial, subjects were
presented with a food item for 3 s and asked to rate their preference for it
on an eight-point scale. (B) Examples of a Self trial and a Computer trial
during the Choice task. In a Self trial, subjects were asked to choose one of
two foods which they preferred. In a Computer trial, they were asked to
simply pick the item that a computer randomly chose (highlighted by a red
square). A cue was presented for 1.5 s followed by a brief delay (500 ms), and
two foods were presented for 5 s. (C) Preference task 2. Subjects were
presented with the same food stimuli as in Preference task 1 and asked to
rate their preference again. However, during Preference task 2, past deci-
sions by themselves or a computer (e.g., “You rejected it”, etc.) were also
displayed under each picture. For items not used in the Choice task, only
pictures of foods were presented.
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Results
Behavioral Results. First, our data revealed that preference for
those foods which were rejected in the PostEx-Choice condition
signiﬁcantly decreased compared with rejected foods in the Self-
Easy condition [t(19) = 7.84, P < 0.001] or those rejected in the
Computer condition [t(19) = 4.60, P < 0.001] (Fig. 2). This
ﬁnding indicates that a typical free-choice paradigm would pro-
duce preference change even in the absence of cognitive disso-
nance, as suggested by Chen and Risen (9). However, our data
also showed that preference for rejected foods in the Self-
Difﬁcult condition dropped even further, and the change was sig-
niﬁcantly lower than preference change observed for rejected
items in the PostEx-Choice condition [t(19) = 1.91, P = 0.036]
(Fig. 2), thus providing evidence for choice-induced preference
change. On the other hand, for the chosen foods, while prefer-
ence changes for chosen foods in Self-Difﬁcult conditions were
signiﬁcantly higher than those in Self-Easy and Computer trials
(both P < 0.01), there was no signiﬁcant difference in preference
change between chosen foods in Self-Difﬁcult and PostEx-
Choice conditions (P = 0.41, n.s.). Preference changes observed
in chosen items in PostEx-Choice task were also signiﬁcantly
higher than chosen items in Self-Easy and Computer conditions
(both P < 0.01). Although we did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant choice-
induced preference increase for chosen items, these results are
not surprising, given that the act of choosing preferred items
does not induce strong dissonance (see SI Results and Fig. S1 for
additional behavioral results).
Imaging Results. We ﬁrst sought to identify areas within the an-
terior striatum that encode subjective preferences for foods. We
conducted a parametric modulation analysis using subjects’
preference and familiarity ratings as covariates [GLM 1; see
Methods for details about all general linear models (GLMs)].
This model was estimated using the data from Preference task 1
only so that any changes in self-report preferences from the ﬁrst
to second Preference tasks remain independent from changes in
striatal activity. The result revealed that there were three clusters
within the anterior striatum in which activity was parametrically
modulated by subjects’ reported preference (Fig. 3A). Other
than the striatum, activations were seen along almost the entire
cingulate cortex (from anterior to posterior) (Fig. S2), and all
activated regions are listed in Table S1. Because some activated
clusters in the striatum extended to the outside of the striatum
[e.g., ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and globus pal-
lidus], the anatomical mask [the WFU PickAtlas toolbox for
SPM (20)] was used to limit our ROI within the anterior part of
the striatum (see SI Methods for detail). Our striatum ROI, then,
consists of three clusters in the anterior ventral striatum with
a volume of 189 voxels in total (Fig. 3B).
To test whether choice-induced preference changes were also
observed as changes in the preference-related brain activity, we
averaged the percent-signal changes in response to food pre-
sentation over the whole striatum ROI (189 voxels) (Fig. 3B) for
all conditions (GLM 2; note that the data for chosen and rejected
items in the PostEx-Choice task were extracted fromGLM3). Fig.
3C plots the activity changes (Preference task 2 minus Preference
task 1) in the striatumROIs for all conditions. Consistent with the
behavioral results, the change in striatal activity for rejected items
in Self-Difﬁcult trials were signiﬁcantly lower than all three con-
trol conditions [vs. the Rejected-Self-Easy condition, t(19) = 1.75,
P=0.048; vs. the Rejected-Computer condition, t(19)= 2.33, P=
0.016; vs. the Rejected-PostEx-Choice condition, t(19) = 2.56,
P = 0.01]. In contrast to the behavioral results, the change in
striatal activity for rejected items in the PostEx-Choice condition
was actually positive. Although this preference change in the
Rejected-PostEx-Choice condition was greater than rejected
items in both the Self-Easy and Computer conditions, the dif-
ferences were not signiﬁcant (both P > 0.11, n.s.). The difference
between Rejected-Self-Difﬁcult and Rejected-PostEx-Choice
conditions remains signiﬁcant even when the β-values for both
conditions were estimated from the same regression model [GLM
3; t(19) = 2.54, P = 0.01]. Percent-signal changes (β-values) for
seven conditions each for Preference tasks 1 and 2 (a total of 14
conditions) are plotted in Fig. S3.
For chosen items, striatal activity changes in the Chosen-Self-
Difﬁcult condition did not differ signiﬁcantly from the other
three control conditions (all P > 0.28, n.s.). In addition, among
Fig. 2. Behavioral result for preference change. Bars indicate the change in
preference for foods from Preference task 1 to Preference task 2 (preference
ratings in Preference task 2 minus those in Preference task 1) in each con-
dition. *P < 0.05; ***P < 0.001 (paired t test, one tailed). Error bars indicate
the SEM.
Fig. 3. (A) A coronal slice showing areas in the anterior striatum signiﬁ-
cantly correlated with subjects’ self-reported preference during Preference
task 1 (P < 0.001 uncorrected). The scale shows the t values. (B) An axial grass
brain showing the ROI in the anterior striatum. The striatal ROI consists of
three separate clusters, a total of 189 voxels. (C) Percent-signal changes
averaged over the whole striatum ROI (189 voxels) were extracted, and ac-
tivation changes in the striatal ROI (striatal activations in Preference task 2
minus those in Preference task 1) were plotted for each condition. *P < 0.05;
**P < 0.01 (paired t test, one-tailed). Error bars indicate SEM.
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other areas correlated with subjects’ reported preferences (Table
S1), no area showed the predicted patterns of preference change
as seen in the striatum.
Next, we investigated the neural correlates of cognitive disso-
nance. To test whether the activity in the ACC and anterior insula
is parametrically modulated by perceived cognitive dissonance on
a trial-by-trial basis (GLM 4), we computed the degree of cogni-
tive dissonance for each trial as the Cognitive Dissonance Index
(CDI). The CDI is deﬁned as the function of the discrepancy
between subjects’ past decisions (i.e., chose or rejected) and their
preferences for each food item (seeMethods and Table S2 for the
detail about the CDI). A higher CDI indicates greater discrepancy
and thus higher cognitive dissonance. Using CDI, preference,
familiarity, and reaction time (RT) for each trial as covariates, we
conducted a parametric modulation analysis on data from both
Preference tasks 1 and 2. To exclude the possibility that CDIs
simply reﬂect lower-level perceptual features of stimuli (e.g., size,
colorfulness, and so forth), we explored the areas positively cor-
related with CDIs during Preference task 2 within the areas not
correlated with CDIs during Preference task 1 (i.e., outside the
areas correlated with CDIs during Preference task 1, with a more
liberal threshold of P < 0.05, uncorrected). Results showed, as
predicted, that the dorsal ACC (dACC) (Fig. 4A) was signiﬁcantly
positively correlated with the CDIs only after choices were made
(i.e., during Preference task 2), but not before choices (i.e., during
Preference task 1) (Fig. 4B). Other activated areas (Fig. S4 and
Table S3) included bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC), which is an area also reported to be involved in cog-
nitive dissonance (21, 22). In contrast to the dACC, anterior
insula activity was found only when we lowered the threshold to
uncorrected P < 0.005 (left anterior insula; x = −32, y = 20, z =
−2, 39 voxels). There was no area whose activity was negatively
correlated with CDIs during Preference task 2 (see SI Results, Fig.
S5, and Table S4 for results of brain-behavior correlations).
We also conﬁrmed that, even when the CDIs for chosen and
rejected items were modeled separately (GLM 5), the same
dACC area was signiﬁcantly correlated with CDIs for both cat-
egories (both P < 0.01), indicating that the dACC activation
depends on the discrepancy per se, regardless of what the sub-
ject’s past behavior was. All other areas listed in Table S3 were
also signiﬁcantly correlated with both CDIs for chosen (all P <
0.05) and rejected items (all P < 0.01), except for the right pri-
mary visual cortex, which was not correlated with CDIs for
chosen items (P = 0.061, n.s.).
Discussion
Although the point raised by Chen and Risen (9) casts serious
doubt on the existence of choice-induced preference changes,
our data demonstrate that the mere act of rejecting favorite
goods actually reduces preferences for them. While our results
ﬁrst conﬁrmed the validity of Chen and Risen (9) and showed
that the typical free-choice paradigm can measure preference
changes even in the absence of cognitive dissonance, our results
also showed that preferences for those items rejected during
difﬁcult choices were signiﬁcantly reduced, even after controlling
for the effect of the information about subjects’ preference
revealed by their choices. Moreover, in the present study, this
choice-induced preference change was observed not only in the
self-report measure of preference, but also in the brain-imaging
measure of preference, namely the activity in the anterior ventral
striatum. Thus, the present study extends previous behavioral
studies in psychology and indicates that choice-induced prefer-
ence change is not a superﬁcial phenomenon seen only in self-
report measures, but is observable as changes in brain activation.
Taken together, our results provide strong evidence that actions
not only reﬂect, but indeed create, preferences.
Past behavioral research on the cognitive dissonance has
generated unique ﬁndings that cannot be easily explained by
economic theory (23), and the current neural evidence sup-
porting the theory highlights this point even further. Because
brain activation measurements are much more difﬁcult for sub-
jects to fake (e.g., less susceptible to a demand characteristic
effect) compared with self-report measures of preference, the
present study provides strong evidence that choice can actually
alter an individual’s hedonic utility. This result poses a challenge
to the neoclassical economics view, which assumes that hedonic
utility determines an individual’s behavior, but not vice versa (1),
suggesting that the relationship between hedonic utility and
behaviors is more complex than assumed in economics. Also, it
should be noted that while there were other regions correlated
with subjects’ self-reported preferences (Fig. S2 and Table S1),
the striatum was the only region showing the predicted pattern of
preference change. This ﬁnding might be because other regions,
such as the vmPFC, are also related to other variables inherent
to stimuli (e.g., arousal), as suggested by Sharot et al. (8).
However, as exact roles played by striatum and vmPFC in a val-
uation process are still debated (24), it would be interesting to
see if, for example, preference change seen in other paradigms of
cognitive dissonance is reﬂected not only in the striatum but also
in other regions. Perhaps future research could address
this question.
We also demonstrated the involvement of the dACC in cog-
nitive dissonance, which supports the hypothesis by Harmon-
Jones (16, 17). Although a previous study reported the in-
volvement of the dACC in cognitive dissonance (18), the present
study extended it in a different paradigm. We showed that dACC
activity reﬂects the degree of cognitive dissonance (CDI) on
a trial-by-trial basis, thus providing more solid evidence that
dACC activity is a neural correlate of cognitive dissonance. Our
result demonstrated that dACC activation in each trial during
Preference task 2 depends on the degree of discrepancy between
subjects’ past behaviors and their reported preferences for foods.
This result matches well with Festinger’s original idea that the
magnitude of cognitive dissonance depends on the degree of
discrepancy between behavior and belief (or cognition) (7). In
contrast to the dACC, the evidence for anterior insula in-
volvement in cognitive dissonance is limited in the present study.
We found left insula activity only when lowering the threshold to
uncorrected P < 0.005, while other brain areas showed strong
correlations with cognitive dissonance.
Among other areas showing dissonance-related activity, espe-
cially notable is the DLPFC. The DLPFC is known to be involved
Fig. 4. (A) A sagittal slice showing an area in the dACC signiﬁcantly cor-
related with the degree of cognitive dissonance (CDI) during Preference task
2, but not during Preference task 1 (P < 0.001 uncorrected). The scale shows
the t values. (B) β-Values extracted from the peak voxel at the dACC (x = 12,
y = 30, z = 46) for Preference task 1 and Preference task 2 (from GLM 4). Note
that exactly the same CDIs for the same food items were modeled in both
Preference tasks 1 and 2, but CDIs were signiﬁcantly correlated with the
dACC activity only during Preference task 2. ***P < 0.001 (one-sample t test,
one-tailed). Error bars indicate SEM.
Izuma et al. PNAS | December 21, 2010 | vol. 107 | no. 51 | 22017
PS
YC
H
O
LO
G
IC
A
L
A
N
D
CO
G
N
IT
IV
E
SC
IE
N
CE
S
N
EU
RO
SC
IE
N
CE
in the implementation of control or behavioral adjustment fol-
lowing the experience of conﬂict (25–30). Interestingly, the
DLPFC, especially on the left side, has been reported to be in-
volved in cognitive dissonance, especially its reduction, in pre-
vious EEG studies (21, 22). The idea that the DLPFC is involved
in conﬂict resolution rather than conﬂict monitoring seems to be
consistent with the fact that we found stronger DLPFC activations
in the present study than was reported previously (18). Whereas
subjects had a chance to resolve perceived cognitive dissonance by
explicitly stating their new preferences in the present study, there
was no such chance during the fMRI scanning in the previous
study. In other words, it might be the case that while van Veen
et al. (18) identiﬁed brain areas involved in passive emotional
reaction to perceived cognitive dissonance (i.e., dACC and an-
terior insula), brain areas identiﬁed in the present study (i.e.,
dACC and DLPFC) are involved in the active dissonance re-
duction process following dissonance perception. Nonetheless,
these two studies converge to show that the dACC plays an im-
portant role in cognitive dissonance; the exact roles played by
other areas in the cognitive dissonance process should be further
investigated in future research.
In conclusion, the present study identiﬁed the neural mecha-
nism underlying the psychological processes explained by a clas-
sic psychological theory of cognitive dissonance (7). We found
the evidence that the mere act of making choices can alter
individuals’ self-report preferences as well as its neural repre-
sentation. Our data also suggest that this dissonance-induced
preference change recruits the same neural network underlying
conﬂict monitoring and subsequent implementation of control.
Whereas past research in neuroscience has focused on the neural
mechanisms underlying bottom-up modulation of value by pre-
diction error signal based on choice outcome (reinforcement
learning) (31, 32), choice-induced preference change in cognitive
dissonance is an example of top-down cognitive modulation of
value based on choice itself. The present results suggest that in
cognitive dissonance, the ACC and DLPFC play important roles
in modulating value signals in the striatum.
Methods
Subjects. The reported analyses were based on 20 subjects (10 male; age
range, 18–24 y). None of the subjects had a history of neurological or psy-
chiatric illness. All subjects gave written informed consent for participation,
and the study was approved by the Ethics Committee of Tamagawa
University, Japan.
Experimental Tasks and Procedures. The present experiment consisted of four
parts: (i) Preference task 1, (ii) Choice task, (iii) Preference task 2, and (iv)
Post-Experimental Choice task. Except for the Post-Experimental Choice task,
all tasks were performed inside the fMRI scanner (see SI Methods for a more
detailed description of the experimental tasks and procedures).
During Preference task 1 (Fig. 1A), subjects were instructed to rate their
preference for the food presented on the screen using an eight-point scale
(1 = do not like it at all, 8 = like it very much). In the Choice task, there were
two types of trials: the Self trial and the Computer trial (Fig. 1B). During
a Self trial (Fig. 1B, Upper), two foods were presented on the screen at the
same time and subjects were instructed to choose one food that they prefer.
Unknown to the subjects, food pairs were determined by the Matlab pro-
gram such that about half of Self trials included two preferred food items
(i.e., preference ratings of 5 or more) and rated similarly in Preference task
1 (i.e., difference in preference ratings was either 0 or 1) (these were Self-
Difﬁcult trials). The other half of the Self trials included one preferred food
and one unpreferred food (i.e., preference ratings of 4 or less), and the two
foods differed in preference by at least three points in ratings (these were
Self-Easy trials). During a Computer trial (Fig. 1B, Lower), subjects were
asked to simply press the button corresponding to the food a computer had
randomly chosen (highlighted by a red square). For the Computer trials,
food pairs were determined similarly to the Self-Difﬁcult trials so that the
Computer trials always included two equally preferred foods. Each food
appeared in only one pair.
In Preference task 2, the same 160 foods were presented on the screen, and
subjects were asked to rate their preference for each food again. However,
one important difference was that for the foods included in pairs presented
during the Choice task, subjects’ (or computer’s) past decisions during the
Choice task (e.g., “You chose it,” “You rejected it,” “Computer chose it,” or
“Computer rejected it”) were presented under each food (Fig.1C). For food
stimuli that were not used in the Choice task, only a picture of the food was
presented on the screen the same as in Preference task 1.
After Preference task 2, subjects performed the PostEx-Choice task outside
the fMRI scanner. Subjects were asked to choose the one they preferred from
the same pairs of foods that had appeared during the Computer trials of the
Choice task. Finally, subjects rated the familiarity of each of 160 foods using
the eight-point scale.
Functional MRI Data Acquisition and Analysis. Functional MRI data acquisition
and preprocessing were carried out using standard procedure described in SI
Methods. Because we were interested in how preference-related striatal activity
might change from Preference task 1 and 2 and whether the activity in the ACC
and anterior insula tracks the degree of cognitive dissonance during Preference
task 2, we analyzed the fMRI data from Preference tasks 1 and 2 only.
We used ﬁve GLMs to analyze the fMRI data. The ﬁrst three GLMs were
used to test the hypotheses that dissonance-induced preference changes are
seen as changes in striatal activity. The remaining two GLMswere used to test
the involvement of the ACC and anterior insula in cognitive dissonance.
GLM 1 was intended to identify regions especially in the anterior striatum
whose activity was positively correlated with subjects’ reported preferences
for each food. The model was estimated only on Preference task 1. The model
included three regressors: (i) each food stimulus onset, (ii) stimulus onset
modulated by subjects’ reported preference for each food stimulus, and (iii)
stimulus onset modulated by reported familiarity for each food stimulus.
GLM 2 was designed to test the hypotheses about preference change in
each condition. This model was estimated using the data from both Pref-
erence tasks 1 and 2. For both Preference tasks, trials were classiﬁed into
seven conditions according to subjects’ choices during the Choice task: (i)
Chosen items in Self-Difﬁcult trials (Chosen-Self-Difﬁcult), (ii) Rejected items
in Self-Difﬁcult trials (Rejected-Self-Difﬁcult), (iii) Chosen items in Self-Easy
trials (Chosen-Self-Easy), (iv) Rejected items in Self-Easy trials (Rejected-Self-
Easy), (v) Chosen items in Computer trials (Chosen-Computer), (vi) Rejected
items in Computer trials (Rejected-Computer), and (vii) Not Used trials (i.e.,
trials in which items not included in food pairs during the Choice task were
presented). On rare occasions (6.54%), subjects chose unpreferred food (i.e.,
the one that had the lower preference rating during Preference task 1) over
the preferred one in Self-Easy trials of the Choice task. Because underlying
psychological processes are unclear for these items, these trials were also
modeled as Not Used trials (note that all food items in Self-Difﬁcult trials
were categorized into “Chosen” or “Rejected” items, even if subjects chose
the food that had a lower preference rating than the alternative). These
seven conditions were modeled separately for the ﬁrst and second Prefer-
ence tasks, generating 14 different regressors in total.
GLM 3 was the same as GLM 2, except that food items in Computer trials
were now classiﬁed according to subjects’ own choices during the PostEx-
Choice task. Thus, GLM 3 included 14 regressors, seven regressors each for
Preference tasks 1 and 2: (i) Chosen-Self-Difﬁcult, (ii) Rejected-Self-Difﬁcult,
(iii) Chosen-Self-Easy, (iv) Rejected-Self-Easy, (v) Chosen items in the PostEx-
Choice task (Chosen-PostEx-Choice), (vi) Rejected items in the PostEx-Choice
task (Rejected-PostEx-Choice), and (vii) Not Used items (the same as GLM 2).
GLM 4 was designed to identify the regions whose activity was para-
metrically related to perceived cognitive dissonance. We ﬁrst computed the
CDI for each food (Table S2). According to the cognitive dissonance theory,
the magnitude of cognitive dissonance depends on the degree of discrep-
ancy between the two cognitions (7, 23). In the present study, subjects’
perceived dissonance in each trial of Preference task 2 depended on their
decisions during the choice task (i.e., chosen or rejected by themselves or
a computer) and their preferences for the food. For example, for the foods
they had rejected, the higher the preference for the food, the more disso-
nance would be induced because subjects’ behavior of rejecting contra-
dicted more with their cognition (high preference for it). In other words,
rejecting liked foods is more dissonant than rejecting disliked foods.
Therefore, the degree of cognitive dissonance (CDI) for the Rejected items in
Self-Difﬁcult and Self-Easy trials is considered to be positively proportional
to preference for the items as follows:
CDIðRejected-Self itemsÞ ¼ preference of the item
On the other hand, for the foods they had chosen, the higher the preference
for the food, the less dissonance would be induced because choosing favorite
foods is more consonant than choosing unfavorite foods. Thus, CDI for the
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Chosen items in Self-Difﬁcult and Self-Easy trials is considered to be nega-
tively proportional to preference for the item as follows:
CDIðChosen-Self itemsÞ ¼ 9 - preference of the item
Therefore, both CDIs for chosen and rejected items have the possible range of
1 to 8 (Table S2). Also, if subjects were not responsible for the choice of
a food (i.e., Computer trials), no dissonance would be induced. Thus, CDI for
the foods in Computer trials and those not presented during the choice task
(Not Used items) was equal to 0, regardless of subjects’ preferences for them.
This model was estimated using the data from both Preference tasks 1 and 2.
The model included one regressor for each food stimulus onset and the
following four parametric modulators: (i) CDI for each food, (ii) preference
for each food, (iii) familiarity for each food, and (iv) RT in each trial. These
ﬁve regressors were modeled separately for Preference tasks 1 and 2, gen-
erating 10 regressors in total. It should be noted that we used preference
ratings during Preference task 1 to compute each subject’s CDIs, and there-
fore, exactly the same CDI was assigned for each food item between Pref-
erence tasks 1 and 2. In addition, because RTs tend to correlate with re-
sponse conﬂict (27, 28, 33), subjects’ RTs in each trial were included in the
GLM as a parametric regressor to partial out the potential effect of such
lower-level conﬂicts.
We created another model (GLM 5) to test the robustness of the ACC’s
involvement in cognitive dissonance. Although in GLM 4 it was assumed that
CDIs for chosen and rejected items have the same sensitivity to self-reported
preference (e.g., CDIs for chosen items increase by 1 when preference ratings
decrease by 1, and similarly, CDIs for rejected items increase by 1 when
preference ratings increase by 1), they might differ in such sensitivity (e.g.,
CDIs for rejected items decrease by 2 when preference ratings increase by 1).
Also, there is no deﬁnite reason to assume that rejecting items with a pref-
erence rating of 4 induces the same magnitude of dissonance as choosing
items with a preference rating of 5 (in both cases, CDIs = 4) (Table S2). GLM 5
was the same as GLM 4, except that chosen foods and rejected foods are now
modeled separately. Because there are no chosen or rejected trials for Not
Used items, these itemswere randomly divided into halves and then allocated
to either “chosen” or “rejected.”
For all ﬁve GLMs, the regressors were calculated using a box-car function
convolved with a hemodynamic-response function. Regressors that were of
no interest, such as the session effect, and high-pass ﬁltering (128 s) were also
included. Furthermore, for GLMs 1, 4, and 5, missed trials (1.95% and 2.25%
for Preference tasks 1 and 2, respectively) were modeled separately as a re-
gressor of no interest. For GLMs 2 and 3, missed trials were classiﬁed into Not-
Used items.
For a priori ROIs (anterior striatum, ACC, and anterior insula), a statistical
threshold was set at P < 0.001 (uncorrected for multiple comparisons) with
an extent threshold of 20 contiguous voxels. Activations outside the ROIs
were reported if they exceeded a threshold of P < 0.001 (uncorrected) and
cluster P < 0.05 (corrected for multiple comparisons).
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